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NO. 65 DECEMBER 2020 Introduction 
A More Robust Russia Policy for the EU 
How Member-State Coalitions Can Contribute 
Susan Stewart 
Since the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the war in Eastern Ukraine 
in spring 2014, the EU has largely been in crisis-management mode vis-à-vis Russia. 
During the past six years, it has become clear that Russia’s actions towards Ukraine 
are not a stand-alone crisis, but rather the expression of a policy that violates the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states and does not seek compromise 
with western actors in the neighbourhood. It is associated with an approach that 
aims to weaken the EU and many of its member states. Finally, the case of Alexei 
Navalny, inter alia, has indicated that the Russian leadership is prepared to use bru-
tality to prevent a viable political opposition from emerging. Considering all this, 
the EU needs a Russia policy that is capable of dealing with Russia more effectively. 
 
A major success of the EU’s Russia policy 
is that all member states agreed to impose 
sanctions on Russia in spring 2014, and 
that these remain in effect. It was unrealis-
tic to expect sanctions alone to force the 
Russian leadership to rethink their actions 
in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the restrictive 
measures were and continue to be an im-
portant and rare signal of EU unity vis-à-vis 
Russia; they greatly surprised Moscow. 
Attempts by the Russian regime to have the 
sanctions lifted show that the latter have 
impacted on the country’s leaders in various 
ways. This was evident, for example, in the 
early days of the Covid-19 pandemic, when 
Vladimir Putin proposed with reference to 
the United Nations that all existing sanctions 
be revoked as a sign of solidarity during the 
health crisis. 
Problems with the EU Approach 
In March 2016 the sanctions were supple-
mented by five Principles, which now define 
how the EU deals with Russia: 1. complete 
implementation of the Minsk agreements; 
2. expanded relations with Eastern Partner-
ship (EaP) and Central Asian countries; 
3. reinforced resilience within the EU against 
threats from Russia; 4. selective engagement 
with Russia on e.g. the Middle East, the 
fight against terrorism and climate change; 
5. expansion of people-to-people contacts 
and support for Russia’s civil society. These 
five principles, proposed by the then-High 
Representative Federica Mogherini and ap-
proved by all EU foreign ministers, de facto 
replaced the pre-2014 Russia policy. All pre-
vious instruments – negotiations on a new 
agreement and liberalising visas; the “four 
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Common Spaces” of cooperation; the Part-
nership for Modernisation; and regular 
EU/Russia summits – were put on hold and 
have so far not resumed. A return to the 
status quo ante is currently inconceivable. 
The five principles reveal weaknesses 
in the EU’s foreign policy. Especially where 
Russia is concerned, member states’ inter-
ests have diverged significantly for many 
years. The principles are the lowest com-
mon denominator for the whole of the EU; 
going above and beyond them seems neither 
possible nor sought after. Moreover, priori-
tising one principle over another could 
trigger a renewed Russia debate within the 
EU and thus threaten the fragile consensus. 
The principles do not form a coherent 
whole, and it would be difficult to claim 
that they have been consistently and effec-
tively applied in the past few years. 
In part, this is understandable. The com-
plete implementation of the Minsk Agree-
ments is unrealistic since Russia’s and 
Ukraine’s objectives regarding the Donbas 
are incompatible. The expansion of EU rela-
tions with the other post-Soviet states is 
happening as part of the Eastern Partner-
ship and the Central Asia strategy. These 
initiatives are important and must be con-
tinued. However, as a weak foreign and 
security policy actor, the EU is frequently 
unable to respond to these states’ main con-
cerns, particularly concerning hard secu-
rity. As regards selective engagement, it is 
difficult to find potential areas in which 
cooperation with Russia beyond already 
existing levels would be meaningful. This 
is mainly due to the fact that the Russian 
leadership does not take the institutions 
in Brussels very seriously and attempts to 
weaken them as well as some EU member 
states. Given these circumstances, inten-
sifying cooperation makes little sense. 
Resilience and Societal Contacts 
as Focus Points 
In other words, only principles 3 and 5 
remain for the EU to focus on in its direct 
relations with Russia: increasing the resili-
ence of the EU and its member states, and 
expanding contacts between (civil) societies. 
The drive towards more resilience as part of 
the five principles primarily targets Russia’s 
calculated attempts to damage the EU and 
its members. However, EU efforts can have 
a positive impact which goes far beyond 
dealing with Russia, since other actors also 
employ similar strategies against the EU. 
The expansion of contacts between (civil) 
societies has caused concern amongst the 
Russian leadership, which fears they might 
strengthen the opposition or even lead 
to an externally supported regime change. 
Both Russia’s legislation on civil-society 
organisations and its handling of the Peters-
burg Dialogue show that the leadership 
wants to exert far-reaching control over de-
velopments in this area. This principle is 
therefore less about working together with 
official Russian authorities and more about 
societal forms of cooperation. These can 
be promoted through EU and member-state 
institutions, such as the EU-Russia Civil 
Society Forum. In Germany, the basis of 
such support is, inter alia, the Coordinator 
for Intersocietal Cooperation with Russia, 
Central Asia and the Eastern Partnership 
Countries. 
Coalitions as a 
Workable Approach 
An effective approach could be pursued 
via coalitions of member states that share 
similar objectives in one or several areas of 
the existing Russia policy. These coalitions 
could re-energise principles 3 and 5 by coun-
tering specific actions by Russia, such as 
disinformation, money laundering or cyber 
attacks. Coalitions could also be active in 
supporting particular groups within Russia, 
for instance with regard to visa issues and 
civil-society cooperation. This would be 
easier than readjusting all principles at the 
EU level, since some member states have 
strong preferences for individual principles. 
The joint declaration by France, Latvia 
and Lithuania in September 2020 can serve 
as an example of how to initiate such co-
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operation. It calls for measures that 
strengthen the security of elections and tar-
get disinformation. Even though the dec-
laration does not explicitly refer to Russia, 
many of the measures mentioned are espe-
cially relevant in the Russian case. The 
three countries argue that the EU could be 
more proactive in this area under the Euro-
pean Democracy Action Plan, presented on 
3 December. This appeal by France, Latvia 
and Lithuania to the EU level is important. 
However, the purpose of the cooperation 
suggested in this analysis is for interested 
member states to act on their own initia-
tive, without waiting for the approach to 
become an EU-wide policy. In the context 
of the above-mentioned declaration, the 
three countries could therefore jointly take 
stock of the resources that they currently 
employ and the measures that they already 
undertake to ensure election security and 
to counter disinformation. In a second step, 
they would henceforth coordinate their 
actions in these areas and exploit potential 
synergies. Thus they could tie into existing 
EU measures, for instance the Joint Action 
Plan against Disinformation, and strengthen 
them through action on the national level. 
As regards civil-society cooperation, activ-
ists in countries such as Germany, Poland, 
Sweden, Finland and the Czech Republic 
have extensive contacts with suitable Rus-
sian actors and could mutually benefit from 
systematic exchange. This would facilitate 
finding creative ways of handling the 
numerous administrative and legal hurdles 
that confront civil-society cooperation in 
Russia. Official support in the relevant mem-
ber states, both tangible and intangible, 
could contribute to this. 
The approach suggested here is potentially 
risky, since foreign policy would initially 
be relocated onto the nation-state level to 
some extent. It is nevertheless ultimately 
based on the idea of transcending the in-
dividual nation-state. The project’s strength 
is that a number of interested member 
states could come together in this domain 
and act with combined force. Similar coali-
tions of affected EU member states could 
tackle other projects: to contain Russian 
money laundering, Germany, Estonia, Lat-
via, Denmark, Sweden and Poland, for in-
stance, could join forces. To counter cyber 
attacks, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Sweden 
and the Netherlands, inter alia, could form 
a coalition. Here existing counter-strategies 
could complement one another. Even 
where cooperation already exists, it would 
be sensible to pool it as a combined initia-
tive and thereby expand it. Links between 
member states could thus be strengthened, 
aspects of a common Russia policy could be 
made more visible, and EU citizens could 
be made more aware of the gravity of the 
situation. 
If competing groups of member states 
were to draft two contradictory policies, 
it could become a problem. Astute inter-
ventions by the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Josep Borrell, could prevent this 
or facilitate a compromise. 
Development of the 
EU’s Foreign Policy 
An approach as outlined above could also 
build on other pre-existing initiatives and 
contribute to intensifying Franco-German 
cooperation, as set out in the Aachen Treaty. 
Both Germany and France have recently 
made efforts to pursue enhanced commu-
nication with eastern EU members con-
cerning policy vis-à-vis Russia and the East-
ern Partnership countries. Trips by French 
President Macron to Warsaw in February 
2020 and Latvia and Lithuania in Septem-
ber 2020 testify to such intentions on the 
part of France. They are part of Macron’s 
broader international initiative aiming, 
inter alia, to establish a strategic dialogue 
with Russia. Similar high-ranking endeav-
ours have taken place in Germany, for in-
stance vis-à-vis Poland and Lithuania. There 
are also a number of expert dialogues. 
Germany and France could join together 
and systematically seek out commonalities 
with partners in the eastern EU. This would 
be less about agreeing on a united front 
towards Russia as a whole and more about 
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discovering where overlapping agendas 
with several eastern EU members exist and 
agreeing on joint or coordinated action in 
these sectors. 
However, the efforts should go beyond 
the current approach. The latter seems to 
consist of communicating the French or 
German perspective and better understand-
ing the other side’s opinion, but without 
striving for a convergence of the two posi-
tions. Both countries appear willing to 
represent the interests of the eastern mem-
ber states in their dialogue with Russia as 
well. However, this proposal is unconvinc-
ing unless and until substantially greater 
trust is established. More promising would 
be an attempt to engage representatives 
from these countries in a dialogue with or 
about Russia. This would also ensure that 
more attention is paid to relations with EaP 
states, since actors in Poland and Lithuania, 
for instance, have particularly close con-
tacts with Belarus and Ukraine. 
France and Germany should also consider 
working together with regard to coopera-
tion with Russian civil society. Precisely 
because Germany’s Petersburg Dialogue 
and France’s Trianon Dialogue use different 
approaches, it would be worthwhile to or-
ganize an exchange on their successes (and 
failures) to date and, where appropriate, 
formulate joint messages to the Russian 
leadership regarding its treatment of civil 
society. 
When establishing coalitions, it is im-
portant for the participating member states 
to declare their willingness to embed their 
policy within an EU approach. Close co-
operation between the member states con-
cerned and Brussels will be essential if 
these partial approaches are to strengthen 
the EU’s Russia policy, rather than weaken 
it. Such an attempt would represent an 
opportunity to provide some parts of the 
existing policy with more meaningful and 
effective content and make the EU more 
resilient in areas where it has been con-
fronted with destructive acts in the past 
few years, by Russia in particular. Partial 
approaches could thus contribute to devel-
oping a more robust EU foreign policy, ini-
tiated by shifting member-state coalitions. 
Dr Susan Stewart is Acting Head of the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division at SWP. 
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